Do Ukrainian firms benefit from FDI by Lutz, Stefan H. & Talavera, Oleksandr
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Lutz, Stefan H.; Talavera, Oleksandr
Working Paper
Do Ukrainian firms benefit from FDI
ZEI working paper, No. B 04-2003
Provided in cooperation with:
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn
Suggested citation: Lutz, Stefan H.; Talavera, Oleksandr (2003) : Do Ukrainian firms benefit













Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung
Center for European Integration Studies
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn
Stefan H. Lutz, Oleksandr Talavera
Do Ukrainian Firms Beneﬁt
from FDI?
B 04
2003Do Ukrainian Firms Benefit from FDI?
1




All countries are eager to attract as much foreign investments as
possible. At the same time FDI may have not only positive, but also
negative economic effects for receiving countries. Positive effects are
associated with technology transfer, efficient allocation of resources, and
training of domestic workers. However, the entry of foreign firms could,
e.g., lead to a decrease of labor productivity at domestic firms, which is a
negative effect. The main purpose of this paper is to estimate direct and
indirect effects of FDI. First, we test for direct influence of foreign direct
investments on firms’ performance, where the latter is estimated
alternatively as labor productivity and as exports. FDI notably increases
both labor productivity and export volumes. Second, we look for
spillover or indirect effects.  There is statistical evidence that the levels of
FDI in certain regional industries are associated with higher performance
indicators of firms’ not receiving FDI in those same regional industries.
JEL classification: L1, L6, F2
Keywords: Foreign direct investment, firm performance, spillovers, Ukraine
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their support.Non-Technical Summary
In 1991, Scotland paid 50.75 million pounds for Motorola to locate a mobile-phone
factory employing 3,000 people. In the late 1980s, Toyota was offered an incentive
package worth 125--147 million dollars in present value for a plant expected to employ
3,000 workers. Other empirical studies have found positive effects of foreign direct
investment (FDI) on different indicators of firm's performance in Indonesia, Russia and
Lithuania.
These studies show that an increase in FDI leads to an increase in the level of local
capability and competition. However, the results vary across countries and across
industries within a particular country. Theory tells us that FDI has direct and indirect
impacts. Direct FDI effects contribute to the differences in performance of firms with
and without FDI. Indirect  (or spillover) effects are spread through specific contacts
between multi-national corporations (MNCs) and domestic firms. Negative spillovers
have been found, for example, for Venezuela, Romania and Poland. While some
empirical work on FDI has been done for several transition countries, this is not the case
yet for Ukraine.
Using unpublished Ukrainian micro data, we examine the effects of the presence of FDI
on the performance of individual Ukrainian firms receiving that FDI. Performance may
be measured as sales or as exports. These direct effects may indicate technology transfer
taking place in addition to capital investment. Secondly, we investigate the effects of the
presence of FDI on the performance of firms not receiving FDI in the same industry or
the same region. These indirect effects, if present, would indicate spillovers. We
anticipate positive, but low, direct and indirect effects on both sales and exports of
Ukrainian firms. We also expect that foreign-owned establishments have comparatively
higher levels of performance and domestic establishments exhibit significant benefits
from spillovers.
The results received imply that the presence of FDI has a positive influence on both labor
productivity and exports. The four regions investigated did not exhibit significant
differences. In addition, we found small, positive spillover effects on both labor
productivity and export volumes of firms that did not themselves receive FDI. Our results
also imply some differences across industries and across different ownership types.1. Introduction
In 1991, Scotland paid 50.75 million pounds for Motorola to locate a mobile-phone
factory employing 3,000 people. In the late 1980s, Toyota was offered an incentive
package worth 125--147 million dollars in present value for a plant expected to employ
3,000 workers (Haskel et al., 2001). Ireland encourages FDI by introduction of National
Development Plan that increases the value and sustainability of foreign companies, and
secures their future.
3 Why does government attract FDI? Is FDI always beneficial for a
country? During the last few years many scholars have raised this question. While
attracting FDI is an important issue in itself, international investments may also lead to
different externalities. As a rule, FDI to a particular firm in a particular industry may give
rise to positive effects on the performance of other firms that entertain business relations
with the FDI-recipient. However, we cannot unambiguously assert these effects of FDI
in transition economies, and in Ukraine in particular. As a rule, transition changes the
way economy operates and may lead to unexpected results. Therefore FDI can bring
both positive and negative externalities. Negative spillovers could occur in the form of
raised monopoly power of multi-national corporations (MNC). These MNCs may have a
strong incentive to acquire and close Ukrainian competitors.
Recent empirical studies carried out by Blomström and Sjoholm (1999), Ponomareva
(2000), Smarzynska (2002) have found positive effects of FDI on different indicators of
firm's performance in Indonesia, Russia and Lithuania. They show that an increase in
FDI leads to an increase in the level of local capability and competition. However, the
results vary across countries and across industries within a particular country.
Furthermore, negative spillovers are found by Aitken and Harrison (1999), Konings
(1999) for Venezuela, Romania and Poland. Theory tells us that FDI has direct and
indirect impacts. Direct FDI effects contribute to the differences in performance of
firms with and without FDI. Indirect effects are spread through specific contacts
between MNCs and domestic firms.
The technology transfer effect appears when domestic firms receive new technologies
and know-how for lower costs from MNCs. The catch-up effect simply means that
foreign firm captures the share of local market or domestic firm looses its market share.
At the same time, the latter effect may have positive influence on local firms. In this case,
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it is called competition effect. Competition effect arises when entrance of foreign firms
forces domestic firms to act more efficiently in order to protect their profits and shares.
The foreign linkage effect appears when foreign companies use services supplied by
local firms. Demonstration effect appears when a home firm, observing the behaviour
of foreign company, tries to mimic it. Finally, the training effect is a situation when
foreign firms provide training for their workers and managers, who in future can be hired
by domestic firms.
Attracting Foreign Direct Investment has already become one of the most essential
issues in the transformation and development of the Ukrainian economy. Because of
substantial technological lags in comparison to developed countries, Ukraine could
benefit from foreign capital inflows and the resulting international cooperation. This
cooperation, in turn, could provide new technologies, new methods of management, and
could also promote the development of domestic investments. Experiences of developed
countries suggest, that often a domestic investment boom starts with the adaptation of
new technologies, brought on with foreign capital.
Currently however, the Ukrainian level of FDI per capita is far below that of most other
transition countries, in particular that of the Estonia, Hungary or Poland. For example,
the USA only invested ten times more into the Polish economy than into the Ukrainian
one
4. Such negligible volumes of FDI could be explained by the discouraging investment
climate, presently prevailing in Ukraine. This is also represented by suspicious attitudes
towards foreign investors displayed by both government officials and Ukrainian industry
managers. To many international investors, it might seem that Ukraine, ex-ante, does not
want to attract any FDI.
On the other hand, Ukraine has a substantial economic potential, which is not yet
utilized adequately. With a population close to that of France, the domestic market is
large. Both skilled and unskilled labor is relatively inexpensive, while the general level of
education and skill is high. Finally, domestic firms do not yet pose a high level of
competition.
Using unpublished Ukrainian micro data, we examine the effects of the presence of FDI
on the performance of individual Ukrainian firms receiving that FDI. Performance may
be measured as sales or as exports. These direct effects may indicate technology transfer
taking place in addition to capital investment. Secondly, we investigate the effects of the
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presence of FDI on the performance of firms not receiving FDI in the same industry or
the same region. These indirect effects, if present, would indicate spillovers. We would
anticipate positive, but low, direct and indirect effects on both sales and exports of
Ukrainian firms. We would also expect that foreign-owned establishments have
comparatively higher levels of performance and domestic establishments exhibit
significant benefits from spillovers.
The rest of the paper is constructed as follows. Section 2 presents a short version of
literature review. In Sections 3 we describe the data and discuss our empirical models
results. Finally, Section 4 concludes and gives suggestions for further research.
2. Is Foreign Direct Investment Good?
``To attract companies like yours. we have felled mountains, razed jungles, filled swamps,
moved rivers, relocated towns. all to make it easier for you and your business to do
business here."
5
Why do governments want to attract FDI?  The intuitive answer to this question is that
governments receive benefits from having foreign firms in the country. Foreign
companies hire local labor, increase aggregate demand and supply or affect the firm
indicators directly. At the same time, there are also indirect effects or spillover effects.
The channels of these effects are: technology transfer effect, competition effect,
backward and forward linkage effect, training effect, and demonstration effect.
Describing indirect FDI effects, Blomstrom and Kokko (1997) discuss transfer and
technology diffusion from multinational companies to host countries, as well as
prevalent ownership of commercial technologies by multinational companies. The
technology transfer channel is also theoretically analyzed by Blomstrom (1987). He
concludes that ``. such a transfer is a central activity of MNCs, and this may stimulate
domestic firms to hasten their access to a specific technology". Ponomareva (2000) also
examines the impact of technological spillovers from FDI on Russian domestic
enterprises. She mentions a positive effect from FDI spillovers and concludes, ``The
effects [of FDI spillovers] depend on host country and host industry characteristics and
the policy environment in which the multinationals operate".  The author mentions an
intra-region transfer of know-how and technology and finds that domestic firms located
near multinationals benefit from this vicinity. Kinoshita (2000) examines the effect of
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technology diffusion from FDI in explaining the total factor productivity growth. She
uses unpublished firm-level data of the Czech manufacturing sector for period of 1995-
98. She finds that both foreign joint ventures and foreign presence in the sector do not
have significant effects on productivity. In addition, the rate of technology spillovers are
different for different industries in the economy. In oligopolistic sectors such as
machinery, there exists a significant rate of spillovers from large foreign presence and
there is no evidence of strong spillovers in more competitive food, textile, wood and
chemical industries.
As for competition effects, Blomstrom (1987) describes it as an increase in competition
when multinational companies enter the Mexican markets that leads to a more efficient
market structure. Blomstrom and Kokko (1997) also examine the influence of
international companies on the performance of the host country, as well as the effects on
competition and industry structure in the host countries. They conclude that FDI
contributes to productivity growth and exports in host countries, yet the exact nature of
correlation between foreign and domestic firms could vary among industries and
countries: some industries are more protected by government, some are less protected.
In a similar vein Ponomareva (2000) stresses the fact that competition with foreign firms
forces domestic companies to protect their market share and profits. In contrast to the
previous study, she finds negative effects and concludes that increase in foreign
ownership negatively affects the productivity of Russian domestically owned firms in the
same industry. Similarly, Konings (2000) finds negative spillovers in Bulgaria and
Romania. He explains that increase in competition from FDI dominates technological
spillovers to domestic firms. Inefficient firms loose market share due to foreign
competition, which in the long run should increase the overall efficiency of an economy.
Blomstrom (1989) mentions that the training spillover channel can be a result of
worker training by foreigners investing in human capital. This effect spreads not only on
foreign companies but also on domestic firms.``In Mexico ... many managerial people in
large locally owned firms started their career in a MNC, and management practices may
in this way be substantially improved in domestic firms". Moreover, Kinoshita (1998)
finds worker training an important source of productivity growth. However, it has some
peculiarities. Domestic firms are afraid of loosing their market shares and they invest
funds to to train their workers and managerial personnel  At the same time she finds that
foreign firms are unlikely to invest in the education of local workers.7
Blomstrom and Kokko (1997) distinguish backward linkage and forward linkage effects.
A backward linkage occurs during interaction between multinational companies'
branches and suppliers. The authors suggest that backward linkage is associated with
MNCs assistance in establishing production facilities by suppliers, increasing quality of
raw materials and training of management. A forward linkage is associated with
consumer-MNC relationships. This channel is less evident than the previous one, and
Blomstrom and Kokko mention insignificance of the forward linkage effect. Similarly,
Kinoshita (1998) also include foreign linkages proxy, but finds statistically insignificant
coefficients.
Blomstrom and Kokko (1997) view demonstration effect as an important channel of
spillovers. It arises when domestic firms try to mimic foreign firms in different areas of
business activity. They suggest, that demonstration is often related to the competition
effect and takes place uncousciously. Kinoshita (1998) determines the demonstration-
imitation effect: when domestic firms observe activity of their multinational competitors
they start to imitate or copy in order to become more productive.
In our research we want to investigate the direct and indirect effects of FDI. Indirect
effect are spread through regional and industrial spillovers that correspond to backward
linkage and competition spillover channels respectively.
We anticipate to find positive linkage effect while competition effect can be both positive
and negative.
 3 Direct and Indirect FDI Effects
3.1. Data description
The data used in this research consist of two EERC Research Center datasets. The first
includes micro-level information on fixed assets, labor force, sales, export, import, barter
operations, and industry-region information. The second contains information on FDI
presence in certain firms.
Alternative  estimations of fixed assets are used in the literature. Following Ponomareva
(2000), our study uses the balance sheet value of fixed assets as proxy for capital, since
this is the best available measure of real capital capacities of the firm. All data are at8
constant 1998 prices, converted using the producer price index from the UEPLAC
(2000) web site
6 (See Table 1).
Our data contains 292 observations of manufacturing firms for the years 1998 and 1999.
25 per cent of these firms have received FDI. A firm is assumed to be a recipient of FDI
if:
  The firm is under foreign ownership; or
  The firm reported a change in the level of FDI received during last period.
The data set covers four regions: Lviv, Kyiv, Odesa and Kharkiv. These regions
represent West, Center, South and East of Ukraine, respectively. The regional
distribution with frequencies and percentages is described in Table 2. As can be seen
from the Table 2, the share of Kyiv, Lviv and Kharkiv regions is 30% each, while the
share of Odesa region is 10%. This may be explained by the fact that the Ukrainian
South is less industrialized than the central or eastern areas.
Table 1. Statistic characteristics of variables used in this research.
Indicator All firms FDI firms
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Balance value of fixed assets,
UAH 1998
17324.32 54366.9 5904.55 12853.74
Sales, UAH 1998 5026.05 15245.07 3353.26 7379.38
Imports, UAH 1998 902.15 3525.32 1548.95 3914.26
Production, UAH 1998 5169.32 15474.25 3948.94 10837.29
Labor force, # of employees 457 1019 255 508
Exports, UAH 1998 852.12 3801.31 1136.95 4246.77
Table 2. Region distribution of firms.
All firms FDI firms Region
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage
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Kyiv region 88 30.14 22 30.14
Lviv region 90 30.92 26 35.62
Kharkiv region 89 30.48 22 30.14
Odesa region 25 8.56 3 4.10
The data set covers seven industries. Most of the firms are involved in food industry (25
per cent) or in metal processing (20 per cent). However, a large number of firms do not
identify themselves as belonging to any particular industry (22 per cent). The industry
distribution of firms is summarized in Table 3.
Table 3. Industry distribution of firms
All firms FDI firms Industry
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage
Metallurgy 24 8.22 5 6.85
Metal processing 58 19.86 8 10.96
Wood and Paper 15 5.14 5 6.85
Construction
materials
26 8.90 5 6.85
Light 30 10.27 9 12.33
Food 74 25.34 18 24.66
Others 65 22.26 23 31.51
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Other physical entities 27 9.25
Other Ukrainian companies 29 9.93
Other foreign companies 61 20.89
Other 106 36.30
The ownership structure of available data is depicted in Table 4. A significant share of
firms (36%) did not report their form of ownership. Workers own 17% of firms in the
sample. Other physical entities are either retired persons or those who bought shares
during certificate auctions.
3.2. The Econometric Models Employed
The main aim of this paper is to estimate the influence of FDI on firms’ performance
and to identify region-industry spillover effects.
In order to estimate the former effect, we develop the following analytical model:
) , , , , , , ( it i i i i it it it Scale OWNERSHIP FDI REGION Industry L K f P   (1)
where
i – index for firm, and t – index for year;
Pit – firm performance, estimated as labor productivity or export volume;
Lit – labor, i.e. the number of workers in the firm;
Kit – capital stock or the balance value of fixed assets;
Scaleit – proxy for economies of scale, estimated as the ratio of a firm’s production to the
average production in the industry;
INDUSTRYi – industry, one of the seven industries according to the specification of the
EERC Research Center;
OWNERSHIPi – type of ownership, one of types of ownership according to the
specification of the EERC Research Center;
REGIONi – region, where the firm is situated;
FDIi – a dummy variable that shows the existence of FDI.11
The dependent variable, i.e. performance, could be estimated in various ways. The ideal
representation would be value added or value added per worker. However, due to data
restrictions, only the variables sales, production, barter, export and import were available to
us for that purpose. , The Hausman specification test was used to identify the correct
econometric specification
8.
The econometric specifications selected are shown below.
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where
FDIi, is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the firm has ever received foreign direct
investments, and 0 otherwise.
REGIONi, INDUSTRYi are dummies, which specify an industry and region, respectively.
For the regional dummies, the Odesa region is the base, and R1 denotes Kyiv, R2 – Lviv,
and  R3 - Kharkiv. The unspecified industry category is the base for the industry
dummies, and the other dummies are: S1 – metallurgy, S2 – metal processing, S3 – wood
and paper, S4 – construction materials, S5 – light industry and S6 – food industry.
OWNoi – are dummies that determine the type of ownership. The unspecified ownership
category is the base for the ownership dummies. We denote O1 – workers ownership
majority, O2 – management, O3 – state, O4 – other physical entities, O5 – other Ukrainian
companies and O6 – other foreign companies.
Our hypotheses for model 1 are as follows:
H10: α2=0: Receiving FDI does not affect labor productivity of the receiving firm.
(H11: α2>0: FDI has a significant influence on labor productivity )
As is customary, we anticipate the rejection of our null hypothesis.
                                                          
8 As we have time invariant FDI dummy variable, fixed effect models do not help us to estimate the affect of FDI on
firms’ indicators. Random effect models have to be employed. The validity of this approach has to be checked with
Hausman specification test for random effect.12
Model 2. Here, performance is measured by export volume. If a firm exports more, this
may be interpreted as a sign of comparative advantage. This model has basically the same
structure as model 1, but a proxy for economies of scale, estimated as the ratio of firm’s
production to the average production in industry, was added. Furthermore, separate
variables for  capital and labor were used instead of the labor productivity variable.
it i it i
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Our null hypotheses now takes the form:
H20: α3=0: Receiving FDI does not affect export volumes of the receiving firm.
Both models presented above may be affected by endogeneity. A priori, we might expect
that firms receiving FDI will have higher labor productivity as a result, and firms with
higher labor productivity attract more FDI. The same links can be traced between FDI and
export. FDI results in many cases in higher export volumes, and conversely, large export
volumes attract FDI.
To correct for this endogeneity problem, we applied the following two-stage methodology.
While FDI is highly correlated with exports, the latter, in turn, is not closely correlated
9
with labor productivity. Therefore, as a first step, we constructed the following measure:
10
it it i EXP const * FDI      ln  (4)
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10 FDI*I is a latent variable derived from probit estimation.13
Thus, we estimated the real effect of FDI on labor productivity. Similarly, estimations
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We anticipate that FDI has a positive effect on firm’s performance estimated as labor
productivity or export.
In models 3-4, we investigate whether a firm that does not directly receive FDI benefits
indirectly from FDI in other firms in its industry-region. In other words, we want to
estimate the influence of FDI intensity, which is represented as a share of investment in a
certain region-industry, on performance of firms that do not themselves receive FDI.
When estimating these indirect effects, there is less potential for endogeneity
11, as we do
not expect the productivity of firms that do not receive any FDI to be affected by the
proportion of FDI in other firms in their industry-region. It is not likely that FDI in the
industry-region should somehow be correlated with the labor productivity of firms that do
not get any FDI. To control for unobserved heteroscedasticity we again use GLS for these
three models.
Model 3. Using labor productivity as a measure of firm performance, our model becomes:




















1ln ln  (8)
Regional dummies have been dropped in this specification, because their coefficients
turned out to be insignificant. The spillover variable is defined as the percentage of FDI in
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the particular region multiplied by the percentage of FDI in the industry of the particular
non-FDI-receiving firm.
Thus, the null hypothesis for model 3 becomes:
H3o: λ>0: Receiving FDI does not increase labor productivity of other firms in the
same region and industry.
Model 4. Here, we use exports as a proxy for firms’ performance. The model takes the
form:
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The corresponding null hypothesis is then:
H4o: λ≤0: Receiving FDI does not increase export volumes of other firms in the
same region and industry.
We anticipate that FDI received by firms in a particular region and industry has a positive,
possibly small effect on the performance of other firms in the same region and industry.
Again, performance is measured by labor productivity and alternatively by exports.
In order to test all four hypotheses, we estimated and tested all four models. Our
findings for the hypotheses testing are shown below for one representative specification
each. More complete estimation results are presented in Tables 5-8 in the appendices.
Model 1 is estimated as variations of equation 5. We test for and estimate the FDI impact
on labor productivity of the receiving firm.
3.3. Model 1
12. Effect of FDI on labor productivity.
Ln(Yit/Lit) = 3.36***  - 0.04 Ln(Kit/Lit) + 0.77FDI*** + 0.07R1i – 0..32R2i +0.16R3i+
+0. .10I1i – 1.10I2i *** + 0 .06I3i -1.84I4i*** -1.12 I5i***+.88 I6i***+
+.53О1i +0.66О2i + 0 .04О 3i +0.41 О 4i -0.37 О 5i+0.57 О 6i**
It could be concluded for all model variations, that FDI has a positive and significant
impact on the labor productivity of the receiving firm. Consequently, we reject our null
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hypothesis H10. Regional dummies are not significant, suggesting that there are  no
significant differences in the effects of FDI among the Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa and Lviv
regions. As for differences between industries, labor productivity turns out to be relatively
low  in metal processing (S2), the construction materials industry (S4), and the light industry
(S5), but relatively high in the food industry (S6). Among ownership dummies, only the
foreign-ownership dummy is significant and has a positive impact. Foreign-owned firms
have higher labor productivity. So, we could suggest that our zero hypothesis is rejected
statistically.
3.4. Model 2. Effects of FDI on exports
In order to test our second hypothesis, we estimated the model from equation 7. Again,
we show one representative specification below, and present more complete results in
table 6 in the appendices. The FDI dummy is significant and positive, which suggests
that H20 is econometrically incorrect. Expansion in the export volume depends on labor.
Regional variables are again not significant, which suggests the absence of regional
differences. Light industry (S5) firms have higher export volume. This could indicate that
the light industry is more export-oriented than others, because it is labor intensive and
Ukraine has relatively inexpensive and high-skilled labor. The coefficients of other
industry dummies are not significant.
Ln(EXPit) = 844.63*** +0.09Ln(Kit) + .95Ln(Lit )***+ 52.22FDI***
- 0.14R1i – .48R2i -.45R3i-0.01Scale+
+ 0.32I1i +0.78I2i  + 0.31I3i +0.72I4i +1.41I5i** -0.80I6i*+
+0.01О1i +0.07О2i + 1 13О 3i +0.52 О 4i+0.97О 5i+2.08О 6i***
With respect to ownership effects, we note that only two of our dummy variables are
significant; these are the state (O3) and foreign ownership (O6) dummies. Export
orientation of foreign owners can be explained by the fact that production in Ukraine is
less expensive than in some other countries due to inexpensive, high-skilled labor and tax
privileges. The significance of state ownership could be a result of direct and implicit
government subsidies. Implicit subsidies typically take the form of lower prices for gas,
electricity and utilities, which are all either still owned or subsidized by the government.16
3.5. Model 3. Spillover effects on labor productivity
This model, as well as the next and last one, tests for spillover effects of FDI given to firms
in a specific industry and region on other firms’ performance in that same industry and
region . Model 3 is described by equation 8 and illustrated below. More complete results
are presented in table 7 in the appendices. This specification estimates the FDI-intensity
effects (or spillover effects) on non-FDI firms’ labor productivity.
Ln(Yit/Lit) = 0.80*** + 0.22Ln(Kit/Lit)*** + 0.002spil*** +
+ 0.58I1i*-0.77I2i*** + 0.87I3i**-0.05I4i -0.41I5i +0.72I6i*+
-0.15О1i +0.12О2i + 0.45О 3i +0.03О 4i-0.59О 5i**+0.07О 6i
According to our results, the spillover variable (FDI intensity) is positive and significant
at the 1% level. This suggests that positive FDI spillovers exist, but their quantitative
effect is comparatively low. We may conclude that this is partly the result of generally low
volumes of FDI in Ukraine. Furthermore, firms owned by other Ukrainian companies
(O5) perform worse than firms with other ownership types. This may be explained by a
specific type of competitive behavior among Ukrainian firms. Business rivals buy shares
of each other in order to have better access to raw materials. Non-FDI firms have lower
labor productivity in metal processing (S2) and wood industries (S3). On the other hand,
the metallurgy industry (S1) experiences positive externalities.
3.6. Model 4. Spillover effects on exports
This final model stems from equation 8. It is again illustrated below, and more complete
results are presented in table 8 in the appendices. This specification estimates the FDI-
intensity effects (or spillover effects) on non-FDI firms’ export volumes.
Ln(EXPit) = -2.58  + 1.22ln(Lit )***+ 0.003spil***+
+ 0.47I1i – .60I2i  +1.24I3i –1.14I4i +0.53I5i- 0.55I6i
+0.37О1i +0.74О2i + 1.32О 3i*+1.23О 4i*+1.12О 5i17
The spillover variable is positive and statistically significant, which implies the rejection
of the null hypothesis for model 4.  The coefficient of the spillover variable, however, is
very small. The coefficient of the labor variable is positive and significant.  None of the
industry dummies are significant. But state-owned firms (O3) and other physical entities
(O4) do exhibit higher exports than firms with other types of ownership.
4. Conclusions
Foreign direct investments to transition countries such as Ukraine are a highly appealing
empirical research topic for several main reasons. For a poor transitional economy, foreign
direct investments promise growth potential far beyond that available through domestic
savings. Secondly, foreign direct investments could lead to several effects, both positive
and negative. And, lastly, there exists little research of this type about Ukraine yet.
The effects of FDI may be grouped into direct and indirect impacts. Direct FDI effects
measure differences in firm indicators between firms with and without FDI. Indirect (or
spillover) effects are  spread to firms that not themselves receive FDI, mostly through
interactions between foreign and domestic firms . There are five main types of effects
discussed in the relevant literature: technology transfer, catch-up, competition effect,
foreign linkage effect and training effect.
Using unpublished micro-level annual data for 292 firms for the years 1998-99, we tested
for statistical significance of FDI impacts on labor productivity (model 1) and export
volume (model 2). Furthermore, we investigated spillover effect in models 3-4.
The results reported in the paper imply that the presence of FDI has a positive influence
on both labor productivity and exports. The four regions investigated, i.e. Kyiv, Kharkiv,
Odesa and Lviv, did not exhibit significant differences. In addition, we found small,
positive spillover effects on both labor productivity and export volumes of firms that did
not themselves receive FDI.
Our results also imply some differences across industries. According to model 1, firms
from metal processing, construction materials and light industry exhibit relatively low balor
productivity, while enterprises in the food industry enjoy a relatively high labor
productivity. We can suggest from model 2, that light industry companies export more
then firms from other industries. According to Model 3, firms not receiving FDI in the18
metal processing and wood industries have lower labor productivity than others industries.
At the same time, the metallurgy industry enjoys relatively high positive externalities.
Either foreign ownership or state-ownership present advantages for both labor
productivity and export volumes, according to our results from models 1 and 2.  A greater
export orientation of foreign owners may be the result of several factors giving the foreign
owner advantages in exports markets. The significance of state ownership with respect to
labor productivity could be a result of Ukrainian government subsidies, tax privileges and
similar policies. According to Model 3 results, firms not receiving FDI and owned by other
Ukrainian companies perform worse than other firms with other ownership types.
While some empirical work on FDI has been done for several other transition countries,
this is not the case yet for Ukraine. One might assume, that main reasons are problems
related to data availability. Similar problems have constrained this research to a data set
of less than 300 firms as well as only qualitative data on FDI. Consequently, we plan to
work with larger data sets and more complete information on FDI volumes in the future.
It would also be informative to estimate the effects of industry and regional spillovers
separately. Finally, we would want to explore the effects of FDI on alternative indicators
of firm’s performance, such as value added and value added per worker.
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Regression results for Model 1




































































































































2 0.0671 0.1121 0.4654 0.5010
In parentheses are standard errors; *, **, *** mean 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively.22
Regression results for Model 2
Table 6. Effects of FDI on exports.


















































































































2 0.3202 0.3215 0.4126 0.5036
In parentheses are standard errors; *, **, *** mean 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively.23
Regression results for Model 3























































































































2 0.0898 0.1091 0.2734 0.2504
In parentheses are standard errors; *, **, *** mean 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively.24
Regression results for Model 4
Table 8. Spillover effects on exports.




























































































2 0.3659 0.3932 0.3535 0.4082
In parentheses are standard errors; *, **, *** mean 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively.2008
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